A string of general early Knesset[1] elections, resorted to during occasional governmental crises, raises the question of improving the electoral law of the State of Israel.

Every early elections complicates the work of the legislative and executive government authorities (in particular, it leads to a reduction in responsibility and incentives during the transition period and delays decisions important for the country), leads to political bargaining and struggles between systemic and small (new) parties, to confrontation of national and fragmented objectives (resulting in unmet needs of certain groups of the population).

Electoral system reform has been on the agenda of the legal and political life of the State of Israel for a long time.

CURRENT SITUATION

Israel has the democratic elements within which parliamentarianism can develop. However, the parliamentary model requires efficiency and effectiveness.

Israel has adopted a nationwide electoral system based on the principle of proportionality, i.e. the number of mandates each list receives is proportional to the number of votes cast for it. The only restriction is the percentage electoral threshold, which today (November 2020) is 3.25% of all legal votes cast in elections.

Of particular note is that in the history of Israel, no party has ever won an absolute majority in the Knesset (61 mandates).

In accordance with the current system, voters vote for a list, not for a specific candidate. Moreover, the voter has no influence or involvement in the formation of factions and coalitions. Consequently, the formation of both the Knesset and the Government is essentially done without the full participation of civil society.

The establishment and maintenance of a proportional system of representation was dictated by the historical conditions of the creation of a national community, that aimed to ensure the broadest possible political representation. This system emerged as a result of increased immigration and the establishment of numerous political parties, that relied not only on political ideology, but also on religious and ethnic affiliation.

According to a number of experts, this voting feature often leads to an incorrect expression of the voter’s will and has deprived election campaigns of their personal character. Particular criticism is directed to the fact that the interests of the majority are being sacrificed in favor of factions, representing a small minority of the population.

In addition, elected parliament members rarely address the concerns of citizens at the local level and often vote in line with the political line of their party.

PROPOSALS

In order for the state system to achieve promptness, clarity and coherence in government and parliamentary actions, stability and effective functioning, and consensus in political decision-making, a set of challenges must be met.

In particular:

To avoid repeated (early) Knesset elections. Every early elections complicates the work of the legislative and executive government authorities (in particular, it leads to a reduction in responsibility and incentives during the transition period and delays decisions important for the country), leads to political bargainingand struggles between systemic and small (new) parties, to confrontation of national and fragmented objectives (resulting in unmet needs of certain groups of the population).
To eliminate the dependence of systemic parties on small parties to form coalitions.
To push the parties to address real rather than populist objectives.
To reduce the protest voting.
To eliminate tension and dissent within the parliament. This in turn will speed up the processes for reviewing draft laws and ratifying agreements.
To preserve equitable representation of all sectors of society (including ethnicity – Russians, Ethiopians, French, etc., territorial representation, confessional aspects)

MIXED ELECTORAL SYSTEM

The principle of nationwide elections is that the State of Israel is one constituency. All 120 members of the Knesset represent all citizens of the country entitled to vote in Knesset elections. It is worth noting, however, that the needs and interests of the population are not common, standardized, and hardly “fit” into a single constituency. A large proportion of the electorate now defines itself as independent and has an increasingly less clear party identity.

A mixed electoral system (proportional and majority) and/or a proportional system with territorial groups (lists)[2] is proposed in order to strengthen territorial representation in parliament as well as the personalization of parties and deputies.

The majority model is clearer to the electorate (“direct mandate”). In addition, it gives a more stable majority in parliament, which ensures cabinet stability. However, this model is likely to be highly disproportionate and more likely to establish a confrontational style of politics, as it prioritizes power struggles over program competition.

The proportional model, in turn, creates more adequate representation and promotes multiparty system. However, there is a risk of fragmented parliaments and the consequent instability of the cabinets formed by them.

The nature of party strategy in majority elections is to win a simple majority, which creates a strong incentive for parties to consolidate and to aggregate as many votes as possible. In proportional elections, parties formulate their program as clearly as possible.

In addition, it is suggested that the electoral constituencies be linked to the settlement pattern of major ethnic, religious groups. Or to allocate single-mandate constituencies on the basis of equal numbers of voters, but to link regional groups within the party list to territories, taking into account the distribution of religious and ethnic groups. For example, in the Knesset of the 23rd Convocation, the deputies are from the center of the country, with only 30 from the periphery.

Consideration should be given to introducing a preferential electoral system – where the voter can set priorities within the list. Through the proposed changes, the voter will have the opportunity to express own sympathies for a particular candidate, in addition to/ instead of voting for a party list.

PARTY REFORM

It is proposed to tighten requirements for intra-party regulation, in particular, by requiring parties to hold primaries[3], with not only party members but also supporters and other voters voting for particular candidates, with control by electoral commissions. This will increase the visibility of candidates and ensure democracy within parties.

Given the fuzziness of the political agenda, resulting from the large number of political forces, taking part in the Knesset elections, it is proposed that only those parties with a minimum number of, for example, 1000 members, functioning for at least 1 year prior to the election date, should be allowed to take part in the elections. In doing so, each member is obliged to pay a membership fee to the party fund. This will eliminate “dead souls” from the membership of the parties.

In addition, in terms of filters for small parties, consideration should be given to introducing an additional requirement: a party may be nominated to the Knesset if at least the statutory number of representatives for local government in a certain number of municipalities has been elected from the party. If not, the party must collect voters’ signatures, also distributed by territory.

It should be a rule that parties are obliged to participate in local government elections. If they do not do so for three consecutive years, the party is subject to liquidation. This would bring parties closer to the people, force them to delve into the local agenda, and lead to the withdrawal from the political arena of parties that are unable to bring their candidates to local government.

In addition, it is proposed to raise the threshold for Knesset elections to 5%, or to require parties to obtain at least a certain percentage of votes in each administrative territory of the country.

COALITIONS

Small (new) parties tend to take a hard line and try to put pressure on both the ruling party and the government through threats of withdrawal from the coalition. It is necessary to eliminate situations in which small parties (with minimal support from the population) are given ministerial positions or committees, only because of their participation in forming a coalition with a system party.

It is proposed that a coalition may be formed by parties which have won at least 10% of the votes in the elections, or have been allowed to have a certain number of Knesset deputies (for example, at least 10% of the established number of deputies). However, within the coalition, ministerial portfolios should be distributed on the basis of the mandates received by the party (set a proportion).

In addition, it seems necessary to establish a clear status and rules of operation for the coalition. For example, to stipulate in law that a coalition is an alliance of parties formed for the purpose of forming a government and for the period of validity of the government. The coalition elects common governing bodies. The decision to dissolve a coalition can only be taken by a two-thirds vote of the central collegiate body of the coalition. The coalition publishes a general program of action for the future government. The program is adopted by the founding conference of the coalition. A report to the electorate (following the convening of the Knesset or the termination of the government) is submitted at the end of the program implementation.

It is also proposed to include in the legislation a provision stipulating that a party which has left the coalition before one year from the date of government formation will lose ministerial posts and the right to receive them when the next cabinet is formed, regardless of the election results. Leaving the coalition in this case means both leaving the coalition, recalling ministers, and not participating in the work of the coalition, its bodies or the government.

All this will make both the government and the coalitions more stable and make the political forces to take a more responsible approach to coalition formation.

In the event of a coalition crisis – to authorize the president to establish an interim (1-1.5 year) cabinet and to oblige the Knesset to select a candidate (from a list it has prepared) for the position of interim prime-minister. In this situation, the Knesset may not be dissolved, or there may be a dissolution, subsequent elections, and if no government is formed again by a new Knesset, the interim cabinet will continue its work. This would ensure government stability and make parliamentary crises less “attractive” for party political bidding.

FREQUENCY OF ELECTIONS / SELF-DISSOLUTION

The Knesset is elected for a period of four years but may be dissolved before the end of its term. The Knesset elections for the 2nd, 5th, 10th, 11th, 13th, 12th, 15th and 23rd Convocations were held early. The elections to the Sixteenth Knesset were held early on the Prime-Minister’s initiative. The elections to the 8th Knesset were postponed by two months due to the 1973 Doomsday War. This is the only time the Knesset has decided to postpone the elections.

Given the generally high actual frequency of early Knesset elections, it is proposed that the term of the Convocation be reduced to three years.

[1] In March 2020, for the first time in Israeli history, the third parliamentary elections of the year took place. This means that each convocation of parliament functioned for less than four months.

[2] It is a question of maintaining a “single constituency” system, but with each party list divided into territorial groups, which receive mandates based on the number of votes received in their respective territories.